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The Myth of the Sacred: The Charter, the Courts, and the 
Politics of the Constitution in Canada 
Eds. Patrick James, Donald E. Abelson, Michael Lusztig 
Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002 (208 pp.) 
Reviewed by Katherine Burket 
By the religious metaphor in this work's title, the editors immediately 
reveal the approach they have taken to their subject. The main goal of 
this collection of essays is to break down the "myths" surrounding 
Canada's constitutional holiest of holies, the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. The myth the editors are most concerned with, and about, is 
the widespread, and the authors believe unquestioningly pious, faith in 
the Charter's ability to bring Canada towards a just and equal society. 
The editors and authors have set out to unpack the consequences of this 
conviction on Canada's political landscape; their conclusion is that 
judicial activism, interest group politics and the increasing centraliza-
tion of power have flipped our political system from one of parliamen-
tary supremacy to judicial supremacy. As an example, the book warms 
up to its theme in the introduction by taking thin pot-shots at what the 
editors believe to be the political infeasibility of using s.33, the "not-
withstanding" clause, which they see as evidence of elected 
Parliament's increasing deference to the non-elected judiciary. 1 
t Kate was once Editor-in-Chief of the DJLS before graduating with a combined Master's in 
Public Administration/Law degree in 2002. She is now clerking at the Federal Court of 
Canada. 
1 Patrick James, Donald E. Abelson & Michael Lusztig, eds., The Myth «l the Sacred: The 
Charter, the Courts, and the Politics of the Constitution in Canada (Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002) at 4. 
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The tack of the editors in their introduction, and in the papers they 
selected for this collection, is quite useful: the papers approach the 
"sacred" beliefs, such as the ability of the Charter to have a positive 
impact on equality and justice in Canadian society, with a scepticism 
based on pure theory and mathematical assessment. In discussing the 
impracticalities of accurately measuring the impact of Charter decisions 
the editors' ideological agenda becomes clear and all the easier to 
engage with head on. The central refrain in the set-up to the essays in 
this collection is that by helping groups who form the most impover-
ished or marginalized segments of our population, we inevitably replace 
them with another group to take up the lowest rung on the ladder. The 
impossibility of achieving true consensus about who is "most 
marginalized" is also discussed, with reference to Frank Michelman's 
thoughts on the failures of legitimacy in any institutionalized decision-
making structure such as Parliament. 
This is a valid point - it is hard to argue that 33 million people could 
agree on who needs help the most, the soonest, the longest, let alone 
agreeing on the definitions of "help" or who constitutes a member of 
that group (R. v. Corbiere is a perfect example). Indeed, there are some 
assumptions that cannot move from the controlled theoretical laboratory 
to complex real-life situations without breaking down. What many 
essays in this collection do, however, is base their critical framework 
upon these assumptions without fully exploring them. For example, the 
editors cite the on-going contentious political debate and real violence 
associated with the allocation of the contentious debate over fishing 
rights in Atlantic Canada between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal fish-
ers as an example of liberal idealists' attempts to improve the lot of the 
"worst off." The problem, they argue, was trying to solve the problem 
by granting further access rights to Aboriginals at the 'expense' of non-
Aboriginal groups traditionally dependant for their livelihood on those 
fishing rights: 
Non-Aboriginal fishermen do not welcome seeing their fishing rights 
restricted in order that income be redistributed toward Aboriginals. 
Those who favour Aboriginal claims, in this instance and in others, 
automatically assume that they are helping those 'worst off. But 
surely the practical difficulties of measurement of both average levels 
and within-group distribution come to the forefront in a case.c 
2 Ibid., at 7. 
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This description ignores many of the complexities involved. Two 
Marshall fishing decisions, violence at Burnt Church and other coastal 
communities, on-going litigation and community upheaval were not 
simply a result of people trying to "[help] those 'worst off'." Rather, 
they are the culmination of centuries of racist politics and policies, 
broken treaties and attempts at compensation, and inarguable realities of 
environmental, industrial and social change. People trying to ensure 
reasonable and fair recognition of Aboriginal rights are not simply 
trying to help Aboriginals out of a sense of liberal guilt; they are, in 
many cases, trying to ensure the Crown abides by its legal obligations. 
The assumption that the re-allocation of fishing rights in the Atlantic 
provinces was "automatic" demonstrates how simplification in the in-
terests of theoretical clarity renders the resulting analysis devoid of any 
practically useless. 
Further, I do not think that the problems of measurement - that is, 
the difficulty in establishing just which groups, are, specifically, on 
average, "worst off' - is a legitimate impediment to taking definitive 
action geared towards raising the general level of equality in Canadian 
society. After all, it was a fairly elected Parliament that determined the 
basic rights guaranteed in the Charter, so it is a troubling 
mischaracterization to say that the Court's interpretation of the scope of 
these rights is misplaced because we cannot know if and how groups are 
benefiting. The scope of the Charter is rightly a matter of interpretation 
for both academics and the judiciary, and problems of implementation 
are properly considered by both the judiciary and Parliamentarians. Yet 
in the analysis suggested by the editors here, these sets of complicated 
and complementary relationships are glossed over via a concern about 
measurements. The editors are more than welcome to their opinion that 
the judiciary has been overzealous in expanding rights, but that opinion 
should not be couched in the guise of the difficulty of building a big 
enough ruler. 
These critiques - the oversimplification of factors contributing to 
socio-political legal flash-points, and the difficulty of transferring 
thought-problem based theories to reality - have been already levelled 
at other academics, perhaps most notably John Rawls and his theoretical 
'original position.' Fitting that this collection takes as a tenet of the 
Charter religion the need to implement a Rawlsian economic plan (one 
that devotes tax dollars to such things as a social welfare net), based on 
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the presumed results of a theoretically administered (and recognizably 
flawed) thought-experiment. The essays as a group then go on to dem-
onstrate how the Charter, the partisan politics that went into its creation, 
and the social welfare policies that flow out of it, have done on the 
whole more hann than good. 
Each chapter explores the sacrosanct dogmas of Canadian constitu-
tional politics in more depth - primarily the presumption that political 
decisions demanded by interest group based politics and granted by a 
judiciary bent on rights and resource redistribution does, in fact, benefit 
Canadians. The authors in this collection are generally critical of these 
trends in the Canadian system, and argue essentially that "under the 
guise of universal fairness, justice-seekers actually promote an agenda 
of redistribution over efficiency."3 This, then, is the calamitous result of 
an unexamined faith: the precarious balance between efficient and 
redistributive institutions and policies is disrupted by increasing inter-
ference on behalf of the judiciary via Charter jurisprudence. 
The book uses Tsebelis' definitions of efficient ("those that 'im-
prove (with respect to the status quo) the condition of all (or almost all) 
individuals or groups in a society") and redistributive ("'those that 
improve the conditions of one group in society at the expense of an-
other"')4 to illuminate this basic dichotomy. The question explicitly 
raised is: what is the balance that achieves justice? Again, the answer 
here is manifest from the beginning: the less judicial intervention forc-
ing the legislature's hand, the better. 
The following chapters fall into four categories, the first of which 
deals with the issue of judicial review and the recognition of various 
minority and interest groups in Canada. In "Judicial Rationalism and the 
Therapeutic Constitution: The Supreme Court's Reconstruction of 
Equality and Democratic Process under the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms", Anthony Peacock concludes that the Supreme Court is using 
Charter litigation as an opportunity not to protect minority groups, but to 
carve out a political role for itself, such that the Court dictates the 
development of social policy. He states that 
3 Ibid., at 14. 
4 Ibid., at 4. 
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[w]ith the aim of achieving substantive equality and removing social 
deviancy from the political landscape, democracy under the Charter 
has become therapy and the Court a rehabilitative clinic.5 
The following paper, by Mark Rush ("Judicial Supervision of the Politi-
cal Process"), develops this thesis in a comparative analysis of the 
treatment of gay rights by the Canadian and American Supreme Courts. 
Both this and the final chapter in this section ("the Supreme Court of 
Canada and the Complexity of Judicial Activism" by Jack Kelly) debate 
the usefulness of judicial intervention in a liberal constitutional democ-
racy, and both essentially conclude that judicial activism tends to 
weaken the democratic nature of the state. 
The second and third sections of the collection focus on rational 
choice theory and interest-group politics, respectively. Tom Flanagan's 
essay on Canada's three constitutions is interesting and sets out clearly 
how rational choice theory is used by academics to explore the relation-
ship between Parliament and the courts. That the basis of his model of 
chaos and game theory developed initially to explain the dynamics of 
separation of powers and legislative committee relationships in the 
United States was important to footnote, as it reveals some of the 
unarticulated assumptions that underlie the scheme. 
The final section of essays deals explicitly with the culture of 
constitutionalism in Canada, both in the sense that our constitution is 
intended to be an expression of shared values, but also in exploring the 
pervasive awareness of the role of the Constitution and the Charter in the 
Canada's political psyche, as put forth in Michael Lusztig's "Deeper and 
Deeper: Deep Diversity, Federalism, and Redistributive Politics in 
Canada". The final essay, Hudson Meadwell's "Is it 'True'?" tries to 
take apaii Will Kymlicka's suggestion that the solution to our intem1i-
nable, insecure constitutional debate is to create a "multination federa-
tion." Meadwell believes that Kymlicka's analogies to other poly-cul-
tural/linguistic federations (Spain, Germany, and particularly Switzer-
land) are false in that not even Switzerland is multinational. In short, 
Meadwell doubts that Kymlicka's suggestion is at all tenable for either 
domestic stability or international relations. He refuses to accept that 
such a move is even desirable, as it amounts to essentially entrenching 
identity politics as the main ground of constitutional recognition of 
5 Ibid., at 35. 
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citizens, and would therefore do nothing more than exacerbate tensions 
between different regions and groups in Canada (such as between 
Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Atlantic fishermen mentioned above). 
The main thrust of these essays is to question what the authors 
perceive to be an otherwise unassailed belief in the Canadian approach 
to social welfare policies, particularly when they are implemented, as 
the authors' believe, via constitutional jurisprudence rather than legisla-
tive pronouncement. The essays, particularly when they are focussed on 
constructing a theoretical analysis, are valuable in demonstrating how 
important it is to push past theory and into real world complexities. 
Considering the potentially disastrous effect of making decisions based 
solely on either "effective institutions" or the "desire to help those who 
are 'worst off','' the debates brought about by the investigations such as 
these are extremely imp01iant in the pursuit of a general consensus on 
intervention and justice. 
